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Abstract 
Several studies have identified the factors that cause public deficits in industrial 
democracies. They consider that economic, political and institutional factors play an important 
role in the understanding of those deficits. However, the study of the determinants of excessive 
deficits remains practically unexplored. Since excessive deficits can have large negative 
spillover effects when countries are forming a monetary union without a centralised budget – as 
it is the case for a group of European countries – this paper tries to explore that gap in the 
literature by identifying the main causes of excessive deficits and the ways of avoiding them. 
Binary choice models are estimated over a panel of 15 European Union countries for the 
period 1970-2006, where an excessive deficit is defined as a deficit higher than 3% of GDP. 
Results show that a weak fiscal stance, low economic growth, the timing of parliamentary 
elections and majority left-wing governments are the main causes of excessive deficits in the 
EU countries. Moreover, the institutional constraints imposed after Maastricht over the EU 
countries’ fiscal policy have succeeded in reducing the probability of excessive deficits in 
Europe, especially in small countries. Therefore, this study concludes that supranational fiscal 
constraints, national efforts to reduce public debts, growth promoting policies and mechanisms 
to avoid political opportunism and partisan effects are essential factors for an EU country to 
avoid excessive deficits. Finally, the results presented in this paper raise the idea that a good 
strategy for the EU countries to avoid excessive deficits caused by the opportunistic behaviour 
of their policymakers would be to schedule elections for the beginning or the end of the year. 
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1. Introduction 
Since 1992 the European Union (EU) countries have been compelled to make 
efforts to actively control their public accounts and to converge in nominal terms. First, 
the Maastricht Treaty defined the budgetary rules – in addition to criteria for inflation 
reduction, interest rate convergence and exchange rate stability – that countries had to 
satisfy in order to take part in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU): the 3% of 
GDP deficit rule and the 60% of GDP debt rule. Then, these same fiscal rules were 
reinforced in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) for countries in the EMU. 
The main justification for using rules to limit the degree of fiscal policy 
discretion is the fact that governments seem to have an inherent propensity to run 
excessive deficits and debts. As politicians represent different groups of interest, they 
tend to demand expenditures in the interest of their supporters, resulting in excessive 
deficits. Moreover, policymakers are also concerned with their re-election. Therefore, 
an excessive deficit can result from the tendency to opportunistically manipulate the 
economy and to loosen fiscal policy before elections. 
This problem can be even greater in a monetary union. In the case of the EMU 
formed by the EU countries, since there is no centralization of the national budgets to 
accommodate asymmetric shocks, countries would be able to pass some of the costs of a 
loose fiscal policy to the other members if no fiscal rules were implemented. This would 
generate higher deficits, growing debts and an increase in the interest rate in the Euro-
zone, putting pressure on the common monetary policy framework and on price 
stability. In the limit, it could undermine the project of the monetary union. Thus, if it is 
important to avoid excessive deficits when a country is not integrated in a monetary 
union, it is even more important to avoid them when they are forming a monetary union. 
Taking into account the problems that may arise from unbalanced public 
accounts for countries in an EMU, this study tries to find the reasons why EU countries 
sometimes run excessive deficits. One of the aims of this study is precisely to provide 
some guidelines for EU countries to avoid such behaviour in the future, especially for 
those that are in the Euro-zone. 
The literature provides a plethora of interrelated economic and political causes 
for public deficits, but the particular study of the determinants of excessive deficits 
remains practically unexplored. Therefore, this paper intends to contribute to the 
literature with a deep analysis of the economic, political and institutional determinants 
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of an excessive public deficit and, in that way, help both to explain why EU countries 
are sometimes affected by excessive deficits and to clarify what conditions may help 
them to avoid such a situation in the future. As this study focuses its attention on the EU 
countries, it defines an excessive deficit as a deficit higher than 3% of GDP, in line with 
the legal concept established by the Maastricht Treaty. 
The pertinence of this study comes precisely from the fact that in Europe, after 
Maastricht, the main reference for fiscal policy and, in particular, for the public deficit 
has been the 3% rule for the deficit. With the implementation of this rule by the EU 
authorities, the analysis of the conditionings of the so called “excessive deficits” has 
gained a special interest, consequently motivating the analysis provided in this paper. 
Contrarily to the traditional literature on public deficits, this study estimates a 
model for a binary dependent variable (excessive deficit) instead of a model for a 
continuous variable (public deficit). This kind of analysis permits us to infer more 
directly the factors that may take an EU country to break the reference value for the 
public deficit. Another novelty is the inclusion of political variables in this kind of 
analysis. Political variables are often used in the study of public deficits but, to our 
knowledge, no other study has provided so far a detailed analysis of the political 
conditionings of excessive deficits. This paper makes that analysis controlling 
especially for opportunistic and partisan effects and political fragmentation. Finally, this 
study also focuses its attention on the effects of the constraints imposed after Maastricht 
over budgetary behaviour, considering a separate analysis for large and small EU 
countries. This analysis is important because the EU rule for the deficit is certainly 
affecting the way fiscal policy has been conducted by some EU governments. 
Using a binary choice model over a sample of 15 EU countries for the period 
1970-2006, this paper provides evidence that a weak fiscal stance, low economic 
growth, parliamentary elections and majority left-wing governments are important 
causes of excessive deficits in Europe. Moreover, the institutional constraints imposed 
after Maastricht over EU countries’ fiscal policy have been important in reducing the 
probability of excessive deficits in the EU, especially in small countries. Therefore, 
supranational fiscal constraints, growth promoting policies and mechanisms to avoid 
political opportunism and partisan effects are essential factors for an EU country to 
avoid excessive deficits. This study also raises the idea that a good strategy for the EU 
countries to avoid excessive deficits caused by the opportunistic behaviour of their 
policymakers would be to schedule elections for the beginning or the end of the year. 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review 
of the literature on the causes of public deficits. Section 3 starts by describing the data 
and the main variables used in the estimation of the factors that influence the probability 
of an EU country being affected by an excessive deficit; then, the empirical model to be 
estimated in this study is presented. The empirical results on the economic, political and 
institutional determinants of an excessive deficit are analysed in Section 4. Finally, 
Section 5 provides a conclusion with the main findings of this paper and some 
guidelines for future research. 
 
2. Literature 
Several studies have been written to identify the factors that influence public 
deficits (and debts) in both OECD countries and EU countries over the last decades. 
Their results are essentially derived from the estimation of panel data models by using 
both fixed effects and pooled ordinary least squares estimators, and the lag of the 
dependent variable is often included as an additional regressor. Those studies conclude 
that economic and political factors play an important role in explaining public deficits in 
industrial democracies. 
The literature on the economic and political determinants of public deficits is 
reviewed in the first part of this section. The second part will be dedicated to the 
presentation of the few existing studies on the determinants of excessive deficits. 
 
2.1. Literature on the causes of public deficits 
The literature on fiscal policy considers that economic variables play an 
important role in explaining public deficits. These deficits are usually characterised by 
some degree of persistence and are highly affected by the amount of public debt and by 
economic performance. 
Regarding the persistence of the deficit, authors agree that the higher and more 
persistent is the public deficit, the more difficult will be for a country to change that 
tendency and to generate structural surpluses to avoid a high debt in the future. They 
usually capture this persistence including the lag of the dependent variable (government 
budget surplus or change in public debt) as an additional regressor in their equations. 
The public debt is considered another important determinant of the deficit. 
Balassone and Francese (2004) and Mink and de Haan (2005) argue that it may have a 
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negative impact on the fiscal balance. A higher debt ratio causes an automatic increase 
in interest payments, which may result in a worsening of the fiscal balance. On the 
contrary, others authors support the idea that a high debt forces the government to take 
measures to reduce the deficit and, consequently, this will generate an effective 
reduction of the deficit.1 Hence, there is no broad consensus in the literature about the 
overall effect of the debt ratio on the public deficit.2 
In terms of macroeconomic conditions, studies are unanimous in concluding that 
the public deficit decreases when the economy is growing faster or when growth is 
above its potential or even when the unemployment rate is low. These variables affect 
the deficit mainly via the automatic stabilizers, i.e. through changes in tax revenues and 
transfers related to unemployment expenditures. 
Another important determinant of public deficits is the interest rate. Several 
studies show that a high interest rate has a negative impact on the public deficit, a result 
that is justified by the increase in interest expenditure on public debt. 
Some authors include the inflation rate in their analyses. For example, Perotti 
and Kontopoulos (2002) and Tujula and Wolswijk (2004) consider that it may directly 
affect government revenues and expenditures which are partially indexed in nominal 
terms. It may also put pressure on the interest rate and have a negative effect on 
investment and economic growth. On the contrary, others argue that inflation can have a 
positive effect on the public deficit, since it erodes the real value of the public debt. 
Therefore, the impact of this variable on the debt is not very clear.3 
Political factors like elections, ideological orientation of the government, 
fragmentation and type of government are considered in this literature another important 
group of determinants of public deficits. The reason for considering political factors on 
the analysis of public deficits is originally related to the thoughts of the literature on 
                                                 
1 This effect is more common in studies that use the primary deficit as dependent variable, like for 
example, Mélitz (2000) and Annett (2006). Furthermore, using a quadratic formulation, Mélitz (2000) 
shows that this latter effect is stronger than the former when the debt is (very) high. Empirical evidence 
provided by Annett (2002) for 19 OECD countries shows that countries tend to make an effort to improve 
their budget balances especially when the public debt is sufficiently high. 
2 Another group of authors argue that a good assessment of a country’s public finances requires a 
disaggregated analysis of its government budget. Perotti et al. (1998), Annett (2002) and Perotti and 
Kontopoulos (2002) show that the loss of control over the budget is largely due to increases in public 
expenditures. Their results indicate that to regain control over the deficit, governments should cut their 
expenditures on some specific items such as transfers, subsidies and wages. 
3 Considering a sample of 19 OECD countries, Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) find that the higher is the 
inflation rate the lower will be the deficit, but Tujula and Wolswijk (2004) find no significant effect of 
inflation on public deficits in a panel of 22 OECD countries. 
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political business cycles (PBC).4 This literature followed two approaches. The first 
approach – introduced by Nordhaus (1975) and Lindbeck (1976) – stresses that 
policymakers have a natural motivation to opportunistically manipulate the economy 
before elections as a way of increasing their probability of re-election. This behaviour is 
rewarded by the voters because the election takes place in a period of economic 
expansion and, as the model assumes that they form expectations adaptatively, they are 
not able to predict this opportunistic behaviour. The second approach – a ‘partisan’ 
approach developed by Hibbs (1977) – emphasizes that politicians, when in office, take 
decisions according to their political ideology. In particular, right-wing parties are more 
concerned with inflation than unemployment, whilst left-wing parties are more prone to 
promote economic growth and to fight unemployment than to stabilize inflation. 
These models were updated in the 1980s with the incorporation in their 
assumptions of rational expectations. According to this reformulation, voters’ rationality 
limits the opportunistic behaviour making the political cycles shorter, less intense and 
less regular than in the Nordhaus-Lindbeck model.5 On the partisan side, Alesina (1987) 
shows that rational expectations restrict the partisan effects to the post-electoral period. 
Moreover, this model confirms the traditional partisan idea that inflation 
(unemployment) will be higher (lower) when a left-wing party is in office. 
To detect electoral fiscal cycles in the analysis of public deficit, some authors 
include in their equations a dummy for the election years as suggested by the PBC 
literature. The idea behind the inclusion of this variable is that just before elections 
policymakers may spend more and reduce taxes to increase their probability of re-
election. Therefore, a higher deficit is expected in the election years.6 Tujula and 
Wolswijk (2004) and Annett (2006) show that elections lead to higher deficits in the EU 
countries, but their empirical evidence indicates a decline of the electoral opportunism 
under the (rules-based) Maastricht and SGP periods. In a descriptive analysis for the 11 
EMU countries over the period 1999-2002, Buti and van den Noord (2003) present 
some evidence that governments tend to run a loose fiscal policy in pre- and election 
years, but in non-election years they tend to restrain their fiscal policy to attain safer 
budgetary positions, sufficiently far from the 3% of GDP deficit ceiling, in line with the 
                                                 
4 For a review of the literature on the political cycles see, for example, Alesina et al. (1997). 
5 One important contribution for the rational opportunist models literature was Rogoff and Sibert (1988). 
6 Shi and Svensson (2002) confirm this idea in a group of 91 developed and developing countries over the 
period 1975-1995. 
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requirements of the SGP. A similar result is reached by Mink and de Haan (2005) using 
a multivariate model over the period 1999-2004. 
According to the partisan theory, left-wing governments have traditionally 
promoted a higher degree of public intervention in the economy. Hence, they should be 
more prone to increase expenditures and to generate deficits than right-wing parties. 
Several authors present evidence supporting this view.7 
Besides taking into account opportunistic and partisan effects, some studies 
stress the role of political fragmentation in their analyses of the determinants of public 
deficits. Economists generally claim that minority governments, governments formed 
by multiple parties and governments characterized by a short tenure in office tend to run 
larger fiscal deficits. In a seminal paper in the field, Roubini and Sachs (1989) 
demonstrate that deficits are more common in industrial democracies when many 
political parties are present in a ruling coalition. However, in their analysis, they do not 
make a clear distinction between majority/minority governments and single-party/multi-
party governments. This is a problem that weakens their conclusions, as is noticed by, 
for example, Edin and Ohlsson (1991), Borrelli and Royed (1995), Sakamoto (2001) 
and Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002). Therefore, these authors try to address this 
problem by analysing those two aspects of the political system separately. 
The degree of political support that a government enjoys in the parliament is 
important when unpopular measures like spending cuts or tax increases need to be 
taken. Minority governments usually cannot take these measures without support from 
other parties in the parliament. When that support is not obtained those measures have 
to be postponed and high deficits arise. Deficits may also result from concessions to the 
other parties to get their support. This is not the case when a majority party is in office 
because it can pursue its policies without asking for support from other parties. 
However, empirical evidence on the effects of a majority/minority government on 
public deficits is mixed. Some authors like, for example, Edin and Ohlsson (1991), 
Volkerink and de Haan (2001) and Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) find evidence 
suggesting that minority governments are more prone to generate deficits than majority 
governments. Others like de Haan and Sturm (1994), de Haan et al. (1999) and Woo 
                                                 
7 See for example, de Haan and Sturm (1994), Borrelli and Royed (1995), Perotti and Kontopoulos 
(2002), Sapir and Sekkat (2002) and Mink and de Haan (2005). Moreover, Sakamoto (2001) shows that 
left-wing governments tend to run larger deficits when unemployment is high. 
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(2003) find no evidence supporting this idea for EU, OECD or developing countries.8 
Borrelli and Royed (1995), Sakamoto (2001) and Tujula and Wolswijk (2004) show that 
deficits can be lower under minority governments. The justification for this evidence 
rests on the same ground as the opposite result: as majority governments are able to take 
unpopular measures to reduce the deficit without needing support from other parties in 
the parliament, they are also better able to increase deficits than minority governments if 
they intend to do that. 
De Haan et al. (1999) and Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) consider that the 
distinction between minority and majority may not necessarily capture the notion of 
fragmentation in decision-making. As a consequence, they emphasize the importance of 
the number of decision-makers in the government. In fact, some authors believe that the 
fragmentation of the government is a more important source of public deficits. Roubini 
and Sachs (1989), Perotti et al. (1998), de Haan et al. (1999), Annett (2002) and Perotti 
and Kontopoulos (2002) show that public spending and deficits are higher when 
coalition governments are in office, that is, when the number of parties in the 
government is high. These authors argue that coalition governments have a bias towards 
larger deficits because when multiple parties participate in a coalition they are 
representing different interests, and to maintain the coalition it is necessary to 
accommodate those interests by satisfying their budgetary needs. Consequently, as 
coalition governments have more veto points within their structure and each party can 
demand expenditures, without fully internalizing their costs, it will be more difficult to 
apply spending cuts and to control the deficit when necessary.9 However, Edin and 
Ohlsson (1991) and Sakamoto (2001) found no evidence that the number of parties in 
office affects negatively governments’ ability to reduce deficits. 
The tenure in office or political instability – sometimes called fragmentation 
over time – is also considered by some authors as another determinant of public deficits. 
Grilli et al. (1991), de Haan and Sturm (1994) and Annett (2002) find that public 
deficits tend to be higher when government turnover is higher. Alesina and Tabellini 
(1987) have already emphasized that when political power alternates frequently between 
                                                 
8 In fact, they argue that “… minority governments are often able to reduce budget deficits, as the Danish 
experience demonstrates.” (de Haan and Sturm, 1994, p. 164). 
9 Perotti et al. (1998), Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) and Woo (2003) also consider the number of 
ministers as an important conditioning of public deficits. They show that a large cabinet tends to generate 
more spending, especially in situations of economic slowdown or fiscal distress. 
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competing parties, the higher will be the deficit and debt bias. However, Borrelli and 
Royed (1995) and Sakamoto (2001) find no evidence to support this view.10 
Some institutional factors are also considered important determinants of public 
deficits. Hallerberg and von Hagen (1997), Perotti et al. (1998) and Annett (2006) 
provide some evidence supporting the idea that the delegation of significant budgetary 
power to a ‘strong’ finance minister and contracts focusing on spending and deficit 
targets may help governments to maintain sustainable public finances. However, Perotti 
and Kontopoulos (2002) find no evidence of these effects on public deficits and justify 
this by the fact that those budgetary procedures are nearly time invariant. Grilli et al. 
(1991), Hallerberg and von Hagen (1997) and Annett (2002) argue that industrial 
democracies with proportional representation electoral systems are more prone to 
generate higher deficits and debts than countries with less fragmented institutions. 
Finally, regarding the effects of the fiscal constrains imposed over the EU 
countries after 1992, Tujula and Wolswijk (2004) and Annett (2006) find some 
evidence that the run-up to EMU induced additional fiscal consolidation in Europe, but 
that additional fiscal discipline seems to decrease after that period. 
 
2.2. Literature on the determinants of excessive deficits 
While the literature on public deficits and debts is abundant, the literature on the 
causes of excessive deficits is relatively undeveloped. There are only a few studies that 
really try to analyse some issues related to excessive deficits in the European Union 
context: Bayar (2001), Hughes-Hallet and McAdam (2003) and Hughes-Hallett and 
Lewis (2004, 2005). These studies define an excessive deficit as a deficit higher than 
3% of GDP, in line with the legal concept established by the Maastricht Treaty. Bayar 
(2001) focuses his analysis on the economic determinants of an EU country entering 
into and exiting from an excessive deficit, whilst Hughes-Hallett and Lewis (2004, 
2005) are more concerned with the issue of whether the fiscal improvements created in 
the run-up to EMU have lasted beyond the creation of the Euro-zone. In a different 
approach, Hughes-Hallet and McAdam (2003) examine how explicit deficit targets can 
be used to reduce the probability of excessive deficits. 
                                                 
10 In the face of all this mixed evidence, we can conclude that there is no consensus in the literature about 
the effect of political fragmentation on the public deficit. In a survey on this literature, Perotti (1998) has 
already noticed that the evidence on the effects of political fragmentation on the public deficit is rather 
inconclusive. He believes that this situation can be due to the use, in the several studies on this topic, of 
different samples, different measures of the deficit and different measures of political fragmentation. 
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Using a duration analysis over the period 1970-1996 for the 15 EU member 
states, Bayar (2001) concludes that government receipts and economic growth are 
important determinants for the likelihood of a country exiting from the state of an 
excessive deficit, whereas primary expenditures play a central role for the likelihood of 
a country’s entry into a state of excessive deficit. The level of the debt also affects both 
likelihoods but in opposite directions: the higher is the debt, the higher (lower) will be 
the likelihood of entering into (exiting from) an excessive deficit. Hughes-Hallett and 
Lewis (2004, 2005) also find important positive effects from the lagged debt and deficit 
(and a negative effect from the output gap) on the probability of a country exceeding the 
3% of GDP for the deficit for the 15 EU countries over the period 1960-2002 using a 
simple probit model. However, the focus of their analysis is on the fiscal discipline in 
the post-Maastricht period. They show that it increased until 1997-1998, but eroded 
thereafter to an extent that, by 2005, there was less discipline than before the Maastricht 
process has started.11 Therefore, they conclude that fiscal discipline in the EU was just 
the product of the threat of a country being excluded from taking part in the Euro-zone. 
As soon as that sanction was removed (after 1998), countries seemed to relax their fiscal 
policies and their consolidation efforts. 
Finally, Hughes-Hallet and McAdam’s (2003) stochastic simulations for the four 
largest EU states (Germany, France, Italy and UK) allow them to conclude that fiscal 
targets have to be country-specific and very conservative, and fiscal policy has to be 
forward-looking to keep the probability of excessive deficits below acceptable limits. 
A striking point to notice is the fact that none of these studies actually focus their 
analyses directly on the determinants of an excessive deficit. Hughes-Hallet and 
McAdam (2003) simply analyse the probability distribution of a country’s deficit ratio 
under a variety of fiscal rules; Bayar (2001) is only concerned with the entry and exit 
dynamics of an excessive deficit, whilst Hughes-Hallet and Lewis (2004, 2005) are 
more interested in analysing the issue of fiscal discipline after Maastricht. Moreover, 
they consider that economic factors are the only conditionings of the likelihood of an 
excessive deficit. In reality, to deeply understand why excessive deficits may arise, we 
                                                 
11 In a study of the conditionings of the public deficit in the post-Maastricht period, Annett (2006) shows 
that the benefits of the fiscal rules, in terms of making fiscal policy less pro-cyclical, evaporated after the 
creation of EMU. However, his results are more optimistic than those presented by Hughes-Hallett and 
Lewis (2004, 2005). Annett (2006) argues that the SGP was successful in contributing to fiscal discipline 
in some countries like Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden. 
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may also pay attention to the political environment. This is a fact that the few existing 
studies on excessive deficits have ignored but that this paper intends to analyse in detail. 
This study goes even further by analysing the interaction between the economic 
and political determinants of excessive deficits and by providing separate analyses for 
small and large countries and for countries traditionally affected by large deficits. 
Finally, the econometric analysis used in this study is different from those employed in 
the previous studies. Here, in contrast to the duration model used by Bayar (2001) and 
the simple probit model estimated by Hughes-Hallet and Lewis (2004, 2005), a 
conditional logit model is estimated allowing for country-specific effects. Those effects 
are not taken into account in the previous studies, which may affect their estimates. 
Therefore, this paper intends to cover those limitations and combine economic 
and political factors in the understanding of the causes of an excessive deficit in the EU 
countries. As the 3% rule for the public deficit has been the main reference for the fiscal 
policy in the EU over the last decade, this study also intends to shed some light on how 
that rule affected recent fiscal behaviour or, in other words, how EU countries have 
been coping with excessive deficits after Maastricht. 
 
3. Data and model specification 
This section starts by describing the data and the main variables used in the 
estimation of the factors that influence the probability of an EU country being affected 
by an excessive deficit. Then, the empirical model to be estimated in this study will be 
presented and analysed. 
 
3.1. Definition and description of the variables 
This study tries to evaluate the impact of economic and political factors on the 
probability of a country having an excessive public deficit. According to both the 
Maastricht Treaty and the SGP, an excessive deficit is defined as a deficit higher than 
3% of GDP.12 Therefore, using that value as a reference, this paper looks for the factors 
that affect the probability of an EU country breaching the 3% of GDP rule for the public 
deficit. This means that the dependent variable (Def3) will be a dummy variable that 
                                                 
12 This same value was used by Bayar (2001) and Hughes-Hallett and Lewis (2004, 2005). This seems to 
be a good value of reference because EU countries have been compelled to meet this target either as a 
convergence criterion to take part in the EMU or, after that, as a requirement of the SGP. 
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takes value 1 when general government budget surplus as percentage of GDP (GBS) is 
lower than -3% of GDP, and 0 otherwise. 
Regarding the literature on public deficits, some economic and political 
variables will be used as regressors in the identification of the main causes of an 
excessive deficit. The economic data were collected on an annual basis from the 
AMECO Database of the European Commission (May, 2007) for 15 EU countries 
(Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) over 
the period 1970-2006. The main economic variables used as regressors in this study are 
the following: 
- Primary (general) government budget surplus as a percentage of GDP lagged one 
period (PrimGBS(-1)). This variable is included in the equation to account for the 
persistence of past budgetary imbalances on the probability of an excessive 
deficit.13 We expect that the higher the primary surplus (deficit) in the previous 
period, the lower (higher) will be the current probability of a country breaching 
the 3% rule for the deficit. 
- General government gross public debt as a percentage of GDP lagged one period 
(Debt(-1)).14 This is another important determinant of a public deficit and, in the 
same way, of an excessive deficit. Considering that the higher the public debt, the 
higher is the share of public expenditures that has to be dedicated to interest 
payments generated by that debt, we conjecture that the probability of an 
excessive deficit will increase with the public debt. However, Mélitz (2000) and 
Annett’s (2006) findings indicate that a high public debt may force the 
government to take measures to reduce it by diminishing the deficit. If this is the 
case, the likelihood of an excessive deficit would be lower the higher is the debt in 
the previous period. Which of these effects prevails in this case is an issue to be 
answered in the empirical part of this paper. 
- Annual growth of real GDP at price levels of 2000 (GRGDP). As the economic 
performance of a country greatly affects the public budget through automatic 
                                                 
13 PrimGBS(-1) is used instead of GBS(-1) because this latter variable is highly correlated with the 
government debt (another regressor to be included in the equation). When the interest is discounted from 
the computation of the deficit, there is no longer that problem. Moreover, the government has greater 
immediate control over the primary budget than over the interest payments. 
14 Some economic variables are lagged one period to avoid any reverse causality. 
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stabilizers, we anticipate that excessive deficits will be less likely when the 
economy is growing faster. 
- Real long-term interest rate lagged one period (RIR(-1)).15 This variable captures 
the effects of the interest rate on the real amount of debt to be paid each period. As 
this amount is accounted in the current budget, the higher the interest rate last 
year, the higher will be the burden of the debt to be paid this year and, therefore, 
the higher the public deficit and the probability that excessive deficits arise. 
The data for political variables were mainly collected from Armingeon et al 
(2005) for the period 1970-2004 and the series were updated for 2005 and 2006 using 
information from the internet site www.electionworld.org (Elections Around the 
World).16 The political variables included in the main equation to be estimated in this 
study are the following: 
- Left-wing government (Left) is a dummy variable that takes value 1 when the 
GovParty series in Armingeon et al. (2005) is equal to 4 or 5, and 0 otherwise. 
This corresponds to a situation in which there is dominance or hegemony of left-
wing parties in the government. Hibbs (1977) suggests that left-wing governments 
are more prone to fight unemployment and to promote growth. As this behaviour 
may generate an increase in public expenditure (more transfers, public investment 
and wages), we expect that left-wing governments have a higher tendency to 
create excessive deficits than centre or right-wing governments. 
- Election year (ElectYear) is a dummy that takes value 1 in years of general 
(parliamentary) elections and 0 in non-election years. According to the thoughts of 
the political business cycles theory, we anticipate that excessive deficits will be 
more likely in election years because of the assumed opportunistic behaviour of 
the government in those years. 
- Minority government (MinGov) is a dummy that takes value 1 when a minority 
government is in office and 0 if a (single-party or coalition) government has a 
majority in the parliament. This variable was built using the gov_type series from 
Armingeon et al. (2005). As there is no general consensus in the literature about 
the impact of this variable on public deficits, we do not anticipate any specific 
sign for its coefficient in this analysis. 
                                                 
15 The GDP deflator is used by our source (AMECO) to obtain this variable from its nominal counterpart. 
16 There are some missing values for Greece (1970-1973), Portugal (1970-1975) and Spain (1970-1976) 
because during those periods these countries were not ruled by democratic regimes. 
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Two additional variables were included in the equation to control for the period 
in which the 3% rule for the deficit was implemented in Europe: 
- D92 is a dummy variable that takes value 1 in the period 1992-2006. 
- D99 is a dummy variable that takes value 1 in the period 1999-2006. 
These dummies are incorporated in the model to control for the period in which 
fiscal rules were established in the EU. They will capture the specific behaviour of the 
EU countries in the period post-Maastricht and in the period following the launch of the 
single currency. Both dummies will be included in the same regression. D92 is included 
to capture the post-Maastricht effect and D99 tries to capture any additional effect from 
the SGP, after the run up for EU countries to assure their place in EMU is over. This 
latter variable is included to test whether EU countries have relaxed their efforts to 
control the deficit after they have assured a place in the EMU. 
Besides the inclusion of all these variables in the model, other economic and 
political variables – more or less related with these – will be considered in the empirical 
analysis. They will be described when they are included in the equation.17 
 
3.2. Model specification 
As the dependent variable used in this analysis is binary, the model chosen to 
estimate the coefficients of interest was a conditional logit model.18 This model 
describes the probability of an event occurring given certain conditionings. In particular, 
it will be used to explain the probability of a country breaching the 3% of GDP rule for 
the deficit (or having an excessive deficit), given certain economic and political 
determinants (x). In comparison with the traditional linear specification for the study of 
the determinants of public deficits, this binary choice model has the advantage of 
allowing for the analysis of an important issue not yet fully analysed in literature but 
which assumed a great deal of importance in Europe after Maastricht: how to avoid 
excessive deficits, i.e. deficits higher than 3% of GDP. Mathematically, this model can 
be represented as follows:19 
                                                 
17 See Annex for a complete description of all variables used in this paper. There, we can also find one 
figure with the evolution of the public deficit in the EU countries over the period 1970-2006 and two 
other figures with the distribution of the excessive deficits by country and by year, respectively. 
18 The choice between a probit and a logit model is difficult to justify theoretically, but the practical and 
statistical advantages of the conditional logit for this study were influential in its selection (see the 
reasons below). Nevertheless, results are very similar when a probit model is used. 
19 For details on this and other binary choice models see, for example, Greene (2003, Ch. 21). 
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where β is the vector of parameters to be estimated and )'( βxΛ is the logistic CDF 
associated with the logit model. The vector of parameters β reflects the impact of 
changes in x on the probability of excessive deficits. 
Whilst Hughes-Hallet and Lewis (2004, 2005) rely simply in the estimation of a 
pooled probit model, this paper implements panel data techniques in the analysis. In 
reality, the presence of country-specific effects should be controlled for to avoid biased 
estimates.20 The application of binary models to panel data analysis is straightforward. 
The structural model for a panel data can be written as follows: 
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In this case, y* is an unobserved outcome and εit is an error term. Regarding the 
assumptions made over the error term, we can have either a random effects model 
(where iitit u+=υε  and υit and ui are independent random variables, ui has mean 0 and 
variance equal to 2uσ  and υit is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 12 =υσ ), 
or a fixed effects model (where itiitit dαυε +=  and  dit is a dummy variable that takes 
the value 1 for individual i in period t, and 0 otherwise). Theoretically, the distinction 
between random and fixed effects relies on the relationship between ui and xit. If they 
are not correlated, then we have random effects; if they are correlated, the model has 
fixed effects. Considering that, for the period in analysis, the entire population of EU 
countries is included in the sample and that each country has particular economic, 
political and institutional characteristics, it is highly probable that ui is correlated with 
the regressors. Hence, fixed effects are assumed to be present in the model. 
However, the traditional unconditional fixed effects estimator can be affected by 
some statistical problems. This estimator relies on the assumption that Ti is increasing 
for the constant terms to be consistent. But in this formulation Ti is fixed, therefore, the 
estimators of the constant terms and subsequently the estimator of β are not consistent. 
This is called the incidental parameters problem and it is more severe when Ti is small. 
A way of avoiding this problem is by using a minimal sufficient statistic for αi. 
                                                 
20 Unsurprisingly, the hypothesis of homogeneity of the individual coefficients was rejected in this study. 
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According to the literature and considering the dependent variable used in this 
study, ∑ == iTt iti DefS 1 3  is the suggested minimal sufficient statistic for a fixed effects 
logit model.21 Hence, the conditional likelihood function can be written as follows: 
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This equation is now free of the incidental parameters αi and its maximization can be 
done by the conventional methods. 
 
4. Empirical results 
The empirical results from the estimation of the conditional logit model are 
presented and analysed in this section.22 This analysis comprises the study of the 
economic and political determinants of excessive deficits and some robustness tests. 
 
4.1. Main economic and political determinants of excessive deficits 
The estimation results of the model described in the previous section are shown 
in Table 1.23 The first column presents the results for the main specification, which 
includes the economic and political variables defined previously. A more detailed 
analysis of the economic determinants of an excessive deficit in the group of EU 
countries is presented in the rest of the Table. 
Regarding first the results presented in column 1, we find that the primary 
government surplus (PrimGBS(-1)) has a negative impact on the probability of an 
excessive deficit. This means that there is some degree of persistence of past budgetary 
imbalances. Hence, the higher and more persistent is the primary deficit, the more 
                                                 
21 Despite sufficient statistics being available for the logit model, they are not available for the probit 
model. This represents the main reason for the choice of the conditional logit model. 
22 Although this study presents only results for the conditional logit model, unconditional logit and probit 
models using either random or fixed effects were also estimated, but the main conclusions of this study 
were not significantly affected. Several heteroscedastic probit models were also run considering different 
patterns of heteroscedasticity, but none clearly rejected the homoscedasticity hypothesis. Those results are 
not presented here to save space, but they are available upon request. This note applies to all cases in 
which results are mentioned but not reported in this paper. 
23 Since in the conditional logit the fixed or individual effects are not estimated, it is not possible to 
compute the respective marginal effects. An alternative way of intuitively interpreting the results from the 
conditional logit is using an odds-ratio analysis. As the ratio of the probability of an excessive deficit to a 
not excessive deficit is given by ex’β, differentiating this expression with respect to any of the regressors 
(xk), we get eβk, which means that for any unitary change in xk, the odds will change by a factor of eβk, 
holding all other variables constant. 
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difficult it will be for a country to avoid an excessive deficit. In the second estimation 
presented in Table 1, the effects of the fiscal variables on the probability of an excessive 
deficit are analysed in more detail. The variable PrimGBS was subdivided into its two 
major components: the primary total expenditure as percentage of GDP (PrimTExp) and 
the total revenues as percentage of GDP (TRevenue). As expected, the inclusion of these 
variables in the model, instead of PrimGBS, confirms the results shown by Bayar 
(2001), i.e. that the likelihood of an excessive deficit increases with public expenditures 
and decreases with government revenues. Thus, the significant effect of the primary 
deficit on the probability of an excessive deficit comes from both the expenditure side 
and the revenue side.24 
 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
 
The public debt (Debt(-1)) is another important determinant of the likelihood of 
an excessive deficit. Results show that the probability of an excessive deficit increases 
with the public debt, which is in accord with Balassone and Francese (2004) and Mink 
and de Haan’s (2005) view.25 Despite this effect being lower than the effect of the 
primary deficit, it is sufficient to conclude that the automatic effects of an increase in 
the interest payments due to a higher debt have an effect on the probability of an 
excessive deficit that outweighs any desire on the part of the government to reduce the 
deficit (and to avoid excessive deficits) when the debt is high. 
The square of the public debt (Debt_sq) is also added to the model in regression 
2 with the aim of inferring whether governments’ will to reduce the deficit and to avoid 
excessive deficits decreases when the public debt is very high, as recognised by Mélitz 
(2000) and Annett (2002). In fact, results seem to confirm that idea, i.e. they show that 
the probability of an excessive deficit increases as the debt increases, but for huge levels 
of public debt that probability tends to decrease. This means that when the debt reaches 
high values, governments’ will to control the deficit is higher than the automatic effect 
of interest payments. However, the statistical evidence to support this idea is rather 
                                                 
24 A more disaggregated analysis of the effects of public expenditures and revenues, considering variables 
for government wages, investment, transfers, direct and indirect taxes, has also confirmed these findings: 
expenditure items presented significant positive signs whilst revenue items presented significant negative 
signs (results are not presented here). 
25 As an example, results presented in column 1 show that one percentage point increase in Debt(-1) will 
increase the ratio between the probability of an excessive deficit and a not excessive deficit by a factor of 
around 1.0741 (= e0.0715), holding all other variables constant. 
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weak. The coefficient on Debt_sq is not always statistically significant when included in 
the other specifications presented in this study (results are not presented here). 
The effect of the economic environment is captured by the growth of real GDP 
(GRGDP). When the economy is growing faster the probability of an excessive deficit 
is reduced, which means that a good economic environment is essential for a country to 
avoid excessive deficits. Other variables – like the output gap, the unemployment rate 
and its annual variation – can be used to control for this effect. The results of some 
regressions including these variables are shown in columns 3 to 5. When the output gap 
(OutpGap), measured as the gap between actual and potential GDP as a percentage of 
potential GDP at 2000 market prices, is included in the model instead of GRGDP, no 
significant differences are noticed in the overall results. In particular, the higher is the 
actual GDP relatively to its potential value, the lower will be the probability of a 
country breaching the 3% of GDP value for the public deficit. 
As the economic cycle affects the public budget largely through the automatic 
stabilizers, then when there is a recession, tax revenues decrease and unemployment 
benefits push up public expenditures. Therefore, the effect of a higher unemployment 
rate on the probability of an excessive deficit should be significantly positive. Results 
presented in columns 4 and 5 for the unemployment rate (UR) and its annual change 
(ChgUR), respectively, confirm this expectation.26 
Regarding the effects of the real interest rate (RIR(-1)), we find evidence of a 
negative effect of this variable on the likelihood of an excessive deficit, a result that can 
be justified by the increase in interest expenditure on public debt. On the contrary, the 
inflation rate (Infl) seems to have no effect on that likelihood. 
Concerning the effects of the fiscal constraints imposed by Maastricht and by the 
SGP, results seem to indicate a higher fiscal discipline after Maastricht, and this effect 
seems to be reinforced in the period after 1999. A contrary view is shared by Tujula and 
Wolswijk (2004), Hughes-Hallett and Lewis (2004, 2005) and Annett (2006). They 
claim that fiscal discipline eroded after the run-up to EMU was over. Hughes-Hallett 
and Lewis (2004, 2005) show that the SGP appears to have reduced the probability of a 
country violating the 3% limit, but they argue that the inclusion of simple shift dummies 
in the model does not capture a possible gradual erosion of fiscal discipline. Therefore, 
they also include in their study time trends for the pre-EMU and post-EMU periods and 
                                                 
26 Due to the well-known relation between growth and unemployment rate, we prefer not to include both 
variables in the same regression. In fact, these variables present a high correlation in this study. 
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their results suggest that in each subsequent year under the SGP regime (post-EMU) 
there was an increasing tendency for EU countries to violate the 3% limit for the deficit. 
To capture this idea, some additional changes were made in our fiscal variables. The 
two dummy variables now included in the model are the following: one covering the 
period 1992-1998, i.e. the run-up to EMU (D9298); and the other covering the period 
after 1999 (D99). Additionally, a time trend for each of these periods was included in 
the specification to control for the gradual (annual) effects of the fiscal discipline 
(D9298t and D99t, respectively). The estimation results of such a specification are 
shown in column 7. Only the coefficients on D9298t and D99 are significant. This 
means that, on average, the probability of an excessive deficit is not significantly lower 
after Maastricht than before, but the efforts made by all EU countries to take part in 
EMU were helpful in gradually reducing that probability until 1998. However, after 
1999, despite the probability of an excessive deficit being lower than before Maastricht, 
we are not able to identify further significant efforts to reduce it. Therefore, despite the 
results presented in this study are showing that the efforts of fiscal consolidation were 
slightly relaxed after 1999, they do not indicate any significant erosion of the efforts 
made until 1998, contrarily to what is argued by other authors. 
The political variables represent another important group of determinants of the 
probability of an excessive deficit. First, all regressions show evidence of ideological 
effects, i.e. left-wing governments (Left) have a higher propensity to generate excessive 
deficits than centre or right-wing governments. This result strongly supports the 
‘partisan’ argument that left-wing governments tend to promote a higher degree of 
public intervention in the economy, caring more about unemployment and growth than 
inflation. Consequently, they are more prone to increase expenditures and to generate 
deficits than right-wing parties. In fact, for the same reasons, and as the results 
presented in this paper reveal, they are more prone to generate excessive deficits as 
well. 
Results also show that the probability of an excessive deficit tends to increase in 
election years (ElectYear).27 According to the thoughts of PBC theory, this evidence 
indicates that EU governments are trying to influence macroeconomic outcomes before 
                                                 
27 This variable was also computed taking into account the timing of the elections during the year, 
because in theory the opportunistic effects of an election in the beginning of the year might be felt in the 
previous year. In that case, the dummy takes value 1 in the (pre-) election year if the election was held in 
the (first) second semester of the year and 0 otherwise. Results and conclusions were not affected by this 
different definition for ElectYear (results are available upon request). 
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elections by running a loose fiscal policy (more spending and/or tax reductions) in order 
to increase their probability of re-election. Consequently, this opportunistic behaviour 
generates a higher propensity for excessive deficits in election years. 
Finally, there is some evidence that minority governments (MinGov) have a 
lower propensity to generate excessive deficits than majority governments. Some 
authors have already noticed a similar result in the analysis of public deficits.28 In fact, 
as majority governments do not need support from other parties in the parliament to 
implement their preferred measures – contrarily to minority governments – deficits are 
more able to increase under their terms in office than under minority governments. 
Moreover, as the negative effects of unpopular policies can be more easily imputable to 
a majority than to a minority government, the former can try to avoid them so as not to 
lose electoral support. As a result, the propensity to excessive deficits increases when 
majority governments are in office. According to the results of this paper and the PBC 
theory, this opportunism can be even more intense when majority governments are 
under electoral pressure. 
Thus, the results presented until now show that not only economic but also 
political factors affect the probability of an EU country breaching the 3% rule for the 
deficit. This represents some new evidence for the study of this issue. In particular, 
election years, left-wing and majority governments tend to be more prone to generate 
excessive deficits in Europe. Finally, our results provide some evidence that, on 
average, fiscal discipline did not erode after 1999 in the EU, contrary to what is stated 
by some authors. 
 
4.2. Analysis of the political determinants of excessive deficits 
Some additional political variables will also be included in the model to add 
more detail to the important effect of political factors on the probability of a country 
having a deficit higher than 3% of GDP. Results are presented in Table 2 and Table 3. 
An important aspect to emphasize is the fact that the economic determinants of an 
excessive deficit and the dummies for the fiscal constraints remain always highly 
significant independently of changes made in the political variables. 
                                                 
28 See Borrelli and Royed (1995), Sakamoto (2001) and Tujula and Wolswijk (2004). In fact, as stated by 
Edin and Ohlsson (1991), some minority EU governments, like successive Danish and Swedish 
governments, have been successful in avoiding excessive deficits. 
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In the first two columns of Table 2, other variables are used to capture the 
partisan effects. As indicated in Section 3.1, the dummy variable Left was computed 
from the ordinal index GovParty to capture the existence of partisan effects according to 
the traditional dichotomy between ‘left’ and ‘right’ parties. However, when GovParty is 
included instead of Left the conclusions about the effects of the political orientation of 
the government on the likelihood of an excessive deficit do not change. As the 
ideological orientation of the government changes gradually from the right to the left 
the probability of an excessive deficit increases. Alternatively, we can include the 
percentage of left or right-wing parties in the cabinet as a way of controlling more 
directly for the effects of the relative power that that party has in the government. The 
percentage of right-wing parties in the cabinet was included (%Right) in the second 
regression. Results remain consistent and show that the higher is the percentage of right 
oriented policymakers in the government, the lower will be the probability of an 
excessive deficit. 
 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
 
In column 3, a dummy variable that takes value 1 in the years before elections 
(YrBeforeElect) was included in the model to capture possible opportunistic effects in 
those years, i.e. to control for the possibility that the government starts to prepare the 
field for its re-election in advance. The coefficient on this variable is positive but it is 
not significant, whilst the coefficient on ElectYear remains highly significant. This 
means that governments avoid starting too early to influence economic activity, 
because, in that case, it may not be possible to hide the effects of tax reductions or 
increases in expenditures on the budget balance. In fact, it is less easy to hide the 
negative effects of those measures in a pre-election year than in an election year since 
the information on the pre-election year’s budget deficit is likely to be published prior 
to the election date. 
To study in more detail this opportunistic government behaviour, the dummy 
ElectYear was decomposed into four dummies, each of them taking the value of 1 in the 
quarter in which the election takes place and 0 otherwise: ElectQ1, ElectQ2, ElectQ3, 
and ElectQ4. The idea is to find whether opportunistic policymakers can profit from the 
timing of an election in the course of the year. Results are presented in column 4 and 
show that there is a higher margin for an opportunistic behaviour when elections take 
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place in the second or third quarters of the year. The probability of an excessive deficit 
increases as election dates move from the beginning to the middle of the year, 
decreasing again as election dates move to the end of the year. Some reasons can be 
advanced for this result. First, if elections take place at the beginning of the year – 
which coincides with the fiscal year for most EU countries29 – the incumbent 
government may not have enough time to manipulate the economy because the 
information on its fiscal performance in the previous year is not easy to hide and, in 
reality, it will be evaluated on the basis of that performance. When the election date 
moves to the second and third quarters, opportunistic policymakers have more time to 
manipulate the economy and signal competence because the information about its fiscal 
performance in that year is not available yet. However, as we move to the end of the 
year, more reliable information on the budget balance becomes available. This fact will 
decrease the incentive for the incumbent government to signal false competence. Thus, 
according to these results, a good strategy for EU countries to avoid excessive deficits 
caused by the opportunistic behaviour of their policymakers would be to schedule 
elections for the beginning or end of the year. 
An important conclusion obtained in the work done so far is the fact that all the 
above results are consistent with the rational opportunistic models in the sense that 
governments try to signal competence before the election date but the period to do that 
is indeed shorter than the one predicted by the traditional Nordhaus-Lindbeck model. 
The PBC theory not only states that governments try to manipulate the economy 
right before elections in order to increase their chance of re-election but also argues that 
after elections governments will try to correct the fiscal imbalances generated by the 
electoral period. Therefore, we expect that the probability of an excessive deficit is 
lower after elections. Results presented in the last 3 columns of Table 2 give some 
support to this expectation. The first variable used to control for this idea is a dummy 
that takes value 1 in the first half of the political cycle of a government (PolCycle). 
Results suggest that the propensity for an excessive deficit is lower in the first half of 
the mandate than in the second. However, results presented in regressions 6 and 7 show 
that the efforts to control excessive deficits are especially felt in the second (and third) 
year(s) after last election. Thus, evidence is suggesting that the correction of a 
substantial fiscal imbalance is not immediate; it takes some time for the measures taken 
                                                 
29 The UK is an exception because the fiscal year starts in the second quarter of the calendar year. 
However, results were not affected by the re-codification of the dummies to take that into account. 
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by the new government to control an excessive deficit to have visible effects. This 
evidence represents a new and interesting finding in this field. 
The effects of the fragmentation of political power on the likelihood of an 
excessive deficit are deeply analysed in Table 3. In the first column, the issue of the 
fragmentation over time is analysed. Some authors consider the tenure in office or 
political instability as an important determinant of public deficits (Grilli et al. (1991), de 
Haan and Sturm (1994) and Annett (2002)). The variable used in this study to capture 
the effect of the political instability is the number of changes in government per year 
(NGovChg). As it is highly correlated with ElectYear, this last variable was dropped 
from this regression. Results show that the higher instability caused by changes in 
government is also one of the causes of excessive deficits. 
 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
 
The next two regressions consider the direct effects of two variables that are 
often used in the empirical literature to capture the impact of political fragmentation on 
public deficits: the Roubini and Sachs’ (1989) index for the fragmentation of the 
political system (RSIndex); and the type of government in office (GovType).30 
Economists generally claim that governments formed by multiple parties and minority 
governments tend to run larger deficits. Our evidence for the EU countries is contrary to 
that view. Results show that the greater is the fragmentation of the political system the 
lower will be the probability of an excessive deficit arising. The justification for this 
result is somehow related to the one advanced to explain the result obtained for 
MinGov: as less fragmented (especially single-party) governments are more able to take 
unpopular measures to reduce the public deficit, they are also better able to increase 
deficits if they intend to do so; moreover, as the negative effects of unpopular policies 
can be more easily imputable to a less fragmented than to a more fragmented 
government, single-party governments may avoid restrictive fiscal policies so as not to 
lose electoral support. 
However, these two variables have a problem that was already noticed by Edin 
and Ohlsson (1991), Borrelli and Royed (1995), Sakamoto (2001) and Perotti and 
Kontopoulos (2002): as they do not make a clear distinction between majority/minority 
                                                 
30 See Annex for details on their definition and sources. 
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governments and single-party/multi-party governments, they are essentially capturing 
the effects of minority governments. In order to address this problem, we include in the 
model two variables to control directly for those two aspects of the political system: one 
for the degree of government control over the parliament (MinGov); and other for the 
number of parties in the government (NGovParty).31 In fact, only the coefficient 
associated with MinGov is significant; the number of parties in the government coalition 
seems to have no significant effect on the probability of an excessive deficit.32 Even 
when a dummy that takes value 1 when a single party government is in office (SPGov) 
is included instead of NPartyGov, no significant evidence is found that single-party 
governments are more (or less) prone to avoid excessive deficits than multi-party 
governments. Hence, it is the degree of government control over the parliament rather 
than the number of parties in the coalition that is important to explain excessive deficits. 
To analyse in more detail the effect of the degree of government control over the 
parliament, two dummies were included in the model instead of MinGov: a dummy that 
takes value 1 when the government is formed by a single party with a majority in the 
parliament (MajSPGov); and other that assumes value 1 when the government is formed 
by a coalition with a majority in the parliament (CoalGov). Results confirm the idea that 
single-party majority governments have a higher propensity for excessive deficits than 
minority governments. As single-party majority governments have more power to 
control deficits, they also have more power to satisfy the spending demands of their 
supporters. This total control over fiscal policy by just one party and the already 
mentioned electoral motivation can make excessive deficits more likely under this kind 
of government than under minority (or coalition) governments, where there is some 
control by the other parties to avoid this opportunism. 
In the regression presented in the last column of Table 3, the impact of the 
degree of fragmentation of the parliament on the likelihood of an excessive deficit is 
controlled for by using a fragmentation index for the distribution of the number of 
parties in the parliament (FragIndex). This index is equal to 1/Σpi2, where pi is the 
                                                 
31 This variable was obtained from different sources. See Annex for details. The Herfindhal index for the 
seat shares of all parties in the government (HERFGOV) and the government fractionalization index 
(GOVFRAC), obtained from The Database of Political Institutions (DPI2004), were also used instead of 
NGovParty but their coefficients were not significant either. 
32 Edin and Ohlsson (1991) have previously found no evidence that the number of parties in office affects 
governments’ ability to reduce deficits. We also considered a specification with the number of ministers 
in the government but the coefficient on this variable was not significant. 
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percentage of seats of party i in the parliament.33 Evidence indicates that excessive 
deficits are not directly influenced by the degree of parliamentary fragmentation. 
Some further attempts to control for the effects of other institutional factors on 
the probability of an excessive deficit were made, like the inclusion of two dummies to 
control for the fragmentation of the budgetary process. These dummies are similar to 
those used by Annett (2006) to control for fiscal governance: one takes value 1 when 
the finance minister has leading role in the budget process; and the other takes value 1 
when different parties negotiate a fiscal contract and 0 otherwise. But none of the 
coefficients on these variables was statistically significant (those results are not shown 
here).34 Some authors argue that as the population is getting older some additional 
pressure is put on fiscal finances. To take into account the possible effects of the age 
structure of the population on the probability of an excessive deficit, the ratio of 
population over 65 in the whole population was also included in the model. 
Nevertheless, the coefficient on this variable was not significant and the main results 
remained unaffected. 
 
4.3. Analysis of the interaction between the determinants of an excessive deficit 
After the economic and political determinants have been analysed in detail, it is 
interesting to explore some additional effects from the interaction between those 
determinants of an excessive deficit. One of the aims of this additional analysis is, for 
example, to check whether the political variables matter more in difficult times or not. 
This study does not find significant effects from the interaction between the economic 
and political variables. In the first two columns of Table 4 the variable Left is interacted 
with GRGDP and ChgUR, respectively. The coefficient on Left*GRGDP is not 
significant, which means that both left and centre-right governments will be equally 
unable to avoid excessive deficits when growth is low. A similar conclusion is obtained 
when the annual change in the unemployment rate is used instead of the growth of real 
GDP (see coefficient on Left*ChgUR).35 No additional evidence was found from the 
interaction of the other political variables with these economic variables. Therefore, this 
                                                 
33 This index is the Laakso and Taegepera (1979) measure of the effective number of parties in the 
parliament with parties being weighted according to their size (percentage of seats). The greater this 
index, the greater is the effective number of parties and fragmentation of the parliament. 
34 Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) have already justified the insignificance of these kind of variables by 
the fact that those budgetary procedures are nearly time invariant. 
35 Identical results were obtained for the output gap and unemployment rate when these variables were 
included in the model instead of the growth of real GDP (results not reported here). 
 26
work shows that the idea that political effects are more visible when economic 
conditions are deteriorating finds very little support when our analysis is focusing on 
excessive deficits. In this case, political factors matter in any economic situation. 
 
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
 
In columns 3 and 4 the political variables are interacted with the dummies for 
the Maastricht and SGP fiscal constraints as a way of checking whether they have 
conditioned political behaviour in the EU or not. Results seem to be more robust for the 
period after 1999, but, contrarily to what is sustained by Tujula and Wolswijk (2004) 
and Annett (2006), they show that the partisan and opportunistic effects remain alive 
despite the fiscal constraints imposed in Europe after 1992. In particular, this study 
provides evidence that election years and left-wing governments have had a higher 
impact on the likelihood of excessive deficits after 1999. 
The remaining four columns of Table 4 show some additional results of the 
interaction between the political variables. A striking result is found in column 5: 
evidence suggests that left oriented governments are the most responsible for the 
opportunistic behaviour right before elections; when a left government is in office in the 
election year, the probability of an excessive deficit is higher than when the government 
is formed by centre and/or right parties.36 
Another interesting result regarding left oriented governments comes from 
regression 6: excessive deficits are greatly associated with left-wing governments with 
majority in the parliament, but when a left-wing government is in a minority in the 
parliament our results show that its propensity for excessive deficits is significantly 
lower than when a right oriented minority government is in office. This means that 
when left governments have total control over the parliament they have the support they 
need to implement measures to promote growth and to reduce unemployment. As a 
result, public expenditures will increase as well as the deficit and the probability for an 
excessive deficit. Due to this propensity to generate excessive deficits, the other (centre 
and right) parties will be very stringent in supporting minority-left government 
initiatives. Therefore, minority-left governments have a lower propensity for excessive 
deficits than right-wing governments. 
                                                 
36 A similar conclusion is obtained when Left is interacted with PolCycle (results are not presented here). 
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Finally, despite the coefficient on SPGov not being statistically significant when 
this variable is included in the model, its interaction with Left generates a significant 
coefficient, as it can be observed in regression 7. Evidence suggests that excessive 
deficits are more likely when left-wing single party governments are in office. As left-
minority governments are not associated with excessive deficits, it is likely that this 
result is due to the presence of the majority single-party effects. An additional 
regression was run for the interaction between MajSPGov and Left. Results show a 
significant positive coefficient on that variable (see regression 8). A similar argument to 
the one advanced above to explain why left-majority governments are more prone to 
excessive deficits can be used to justify this result: excessive deficits are more likely 
when left single-party governments with majority in the parliament are in office because 
they have the power and support they need to implement the policies that are more in 
accord with their ideology. This represents another important conclusion of this study. 
Besides these interactions, other attempts were made to find additional inter-
related effects between the determinants of excessive deficits, but no significant results 
were obtained from those experiments. 
 
4.4. Robustness tests 
Some robustness tests were performed to check whether results are sensitive to 
the time period considered or to particular specificities of the countries included in the 
sample. Table 5 presents the most interesting results of those robustness checks and 
from which are obtained some new and important contributions to the literature on 
public deficits for the EU countries. 
 
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
 
The first three regressions provide a pertinent analysis for the periods before and 
after the imposition of the Maastricht constraints. The first regression considers the 
period before Maastricht, whilst in regressions 2 and 3, the sample is restricted to the 
period 1992-2006; in the third regression, the sample is further restricted to the 
countries that have already taken part in EMU. Results show that after Maastricht the 
probability of an excessive deficit seems to be no longer affected by public debts or real 
interest rates. The overall trend to reduce the public debt to less than 60% of GDP and 
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the required convergence of interest rates to low and stable values during this period is 
possibly behind this result. Thus, it seems that Maastricht criteria and the SGP fiscal 
constraints have indeed been effective in controlling the negative effects of these 
variables on the likelihood of excessive deficits. 
Regarding the political variables, the most interesting result comes from the 
coefficient on NrPartyGov for the period after Maastricht, especially for the Euro-zone 
countries. Evidence is suggesting that countries with multi-party governments were 
more successful in avoiding excessive deficits than single-party governments, probably 
because the former were more successful in using the (fiscal) rules imposed by a 
supranational organization to build an internal consensus around the necessity of 
balancing their public accounts. Moreover, results also reinforce the idea that partisan 
effects and political opportunism are still alive and well after Maastricht. 
Some authors state that Maastricht criteria and SGP fiscal constraints are more 
suited to small countries than to large countries because small countries are more 
accustomed to external influences over policy, and, as they tend to have less bargaining 
power, the loss of reputation from violating the fiscal rule is greater.37 Regressions 
presented in columns 4 and 5 intend to provide the necessary empirical evidence for that 
argument – that is, they intend to test if the fiscal constraints have only affected the 
small countries or whether they have also affected large countries. Column 4 shows the 
results for the group of the 5 largest EU countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and 
the UK), whilst column 5 presents the results for the other 10 ‘small’ countries. 
Evidence clearly supports the argument that EU fiscal constraints are more suited for 
small countries: the coefficients on the dummies for the period in which those 
constraints were imposed in Europe are highly significant for the group of small 
countries (see column 4), but insignificant for the group of large countries (see column 
5). Therefore, the fiscal constraints were highly effective in reducing the propensity for 
excessive deficits in the small EU countries but they were ineffective for large 
countries. This evidence is clearly confirmed by the recent violation of the SGP criteria 
for the deficit by France, Germany, Italy and the UK. Empirical evidence also suggests 
                                                 
37 See, for example, Busmeyer (2004), Buti and Pench (2004) and Annett (2006). Buti and Pench (2004, 
p.1027) also argue that the costs of fiscal consolidations tend to be proportionality higher in large than in 
small countries because small countries “have a stronger incentive to undertake supply-side reforms 
rather than pursuing an expansionary fiscal policy, since reforms not only boost potential output directly, 
but also induce inflationary pressure which allows them to gain competitiveness and increase external 
demand”. 
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that fiscal imbalances in large countries are much more sensitive to interest rate 
oscillations than in small countries. 
Next the 15 EU countries are divided in two different groups: the first includes 
only the countries that run excessive deficits – higher than 3% of GDP – in more than 
half of the years in the period 1970-2006 (Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, 
Spain and the UK); and the other contains the remaining EU countries (see Annex for 
details). Two regressions were performed, one for each group. Results are presented in 
columns 6 and 7 and show that Maastricht criteria and SGP fiscal constraints were far 
more effective in the group of countries that traditionally presents excessive deficits (see 
column 6) than in the other group (see column 7). Therefore, those fiscal constraints 
were very important to bring some discipline to the public accounts of the first group of 
countries. Additionally, partisan effects and majority governments seem to be the major 
political causes of excessive deficits in the first group, whilst opportunistic behaviour 
before elections is the main political cause of excessive deficits in the second group. 
Some specifications were also rerun excluding one country at a time. Despite the 
significance of Left and MinGov being sometimes slightly affected when, respectively, 
Greece or the UK and Ireland or Spain were excluded from the sample, results and the 
main conclusions of this paper remain unaffected independently of which country is 
excluded from the sample. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Several previous studies have contributed to identifying the factors that 
influence public deficits (and debts) in both OECD countries and EU countries over the 
last decades. They all consider that a set of economic, political and institutional factors 
play a very important role in the understanding of public deficits in industrial 
democracies. However, the study of the determinants of excessive deficits remains 
practically unexplored. For that reason, this study tries to contribute to the literature by 
identifying the main causes of an excessive deficit in the group of EU countries. 
Estimating a conditional fixed effects logit model over a group of 15 EU 
countries for the period 1970-2006, this paper provides evidence that unfavourable 
economic conditions, parliamentary elections and political instability, and majority left-
wing governments are important causes of excessive deficits in the EU countries. 
Moreover, the institutional constraints imposed after Maastricht over the EU countries’ 
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fiscal policy have been important in reducing the probability of excessive deficits in 
Europe, especially in small countries and in countries traditionally characterised by a 
higher propensity to excessive deficits. However, contrary to what some authors argue, 
empirical evidence does not indicate any significant erosion of the fiscal efforts made 
by the EU countries to take part in the EMU after they have been accepted. 
A more detailed analysis of the results provided by this study reveals that the 
higher and more persistent is the public deficit, the more difficult it will be for a country 
to avoid excessive deficits. High public debts are also linked to excessive deficits due to 
the increase in interest payments, although there is some tentative evidence that huge 
debts can encourage governments to take measures to correct fiscal imbalances. 
On the pure macroeconomic side, this study reveals that the growth rate of real 
GDP is the most important determinant of the probability of an excessive deficit. When 
the economy is growing at a good pace, government revenues will increase. At the same 
time, as unemployment decreases, government expenditures on unemployment 
subsidies decrease too. Consequently, the probability of an excessive deficit will be 
reduced. Low real interest rates have also been helpful in sustaining this tendency, 
especially in the large EU countries. 
Political variables represent another important group of determinants of the 
probability of an excessive deficit. This study provides strong evidence of an 
opportunistic behaviour of policymakers in election years. In fact, EU governments try 
to influence macroeconomic outcomes before elections by running a loose fiscal policy 
in order to increase their probability of re-election. Consequently, this opportunistic 
behaviour generates a higher propensity for excessive deficits in election years. This is 
the main political cause of excessive deficits in the EU area, especially in countries that 
are not usually characterised by such fiscal disequilibria. 
Evidence also suggests that EU governments tend to avoid starting too early to 
influence economic activity, because, in that case, it may not be possible to hide the 
effects of tax reductions or increases in expenditures on the budget balance. This finding 
is consistent with the rational opportunistic models in the sense that governments try to 
signal competence before the election date but the period to do that is indeed shorter 
than the one predicted by the traditional PBC model. Finally, it seems to take some time 
for new governments to control public accounts after elections: results show that the 
probability of an excessive deficit is reduced only two or three years after elections. 
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This study also provides evidence that left oriented governments are the most 
responsible for the opportunistic behaviour before elections. Excessive deficits are 
largely associated with left governments, especially those with a majority in parliament. 
However, a new and interesting result arises from our analysis: if a left government is in 
a minority, its propensity for excessive deficits is significantly reduced. This means that 
when left governments have total control over the parliament they have the support they 
need to implement measures to promote growth and to reduce unemployment. As a 
result, public expenditures will increase, as well as the deficit and the probability for an 
excessive deficit. Due to this propensity to generate excessive deficits, the other (centre 
and right) parties will be very stringent in supporting minority-left government 
initiatives. Therefore, when a left government with minority in the parliament is in 
office, the propensity for excessive deficits will be lower than when the government is 
formed by centre and/or right parties. Moreover, this paper also provides significant 
evidence that it is the degree of government control over the parliament rather than the 
number of parties in a coalition that is relevant to explain excessive deficits in Europe. 
Some authors argue that political effects are more visible when the economic 
conditions are deteriorating. This study finds very little support for this argument. In 
reality, it shows that political factors matter in any situation. Moreover, the results 
provided by this study also indicate that the partisan and opportunistic effects remain 
alive and well despite the fiscal constraints imposed in Europe after 1992. 
Additionally, this study also provides some evidence indicating that the political 
instability caused by an increase in the number of changes in government per year is 
another relevant cause of excessive deficits. 
In sum, this paper shows that the inclusion of political variables is important to 
fully explain excessive deficits in Europe. Going a step forward relatively to the 
existing literature and using a different econometric approach, this study provides a 
detailed analysis of the presence of political opportunism and partisan effects in that 
context. The electoral calendar and majority left-wing governments seem to be the most 
responsible factors for excessive deficits in Europe, a situation that remains well evident 
even after the implementation of the fiscal constraints over the EU countries. 
Nevertheless, evidence provided in this study also reveals that particular attention 
should be given to the impact of those constraints and to the size of each country in the 
analysis of excessive deficits. 
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Regarding all this evidence, this paper concludes that the supranational fiscal 
constraints imposed after Maastricht, low public debts, growth promoting policies, 
mechanisms to avoid political opportunism and partisan effects, and competent 
governments that search for a broad parliamentary consensus are essential conditions 
for an EU country to avoid excessive deficits. Moreover, the results presented in this 
paper raise the idea that a good strategy for the EU countries to avoid excessive deficits 
caused by the opportunistic behaviour of their policymakers would be to schedule 
elections for the beginning or the end of the year. 
After analysing the causes of excessive deficits it would be interesting to analyse 
what factors may condition their duration. Some countries are quick to stabilize their 
public accounts as soon as large public imbalances arise, but others live with excessive 
deficits for a long time. Is that because they have a particular preference for excessive 
deficits? Or, are they unable to take the necessary measures to correct them? This is an 
issue that remains unexplored in the literature and that represents an appealing 
opportunity for future research. 
Finally, it might be worthwhile to extend the analysis of the causes of excessive 
deficits to other developed or developing countries. Their specific economic and 
political environment and the absence of supranational fiscal constraints could perhaps 
shed some more light on the factors that trigger excessive deficits and on the measures 
that could be taken to avoid such fiscal imbalances. In the European context, an 
extension of this study to the countries that have recently joined the EU may possibly 
bring some additional insights to the understanding of the efforts that they need to make 
to control their public accounts towards a future adhesion to the Euro-zone. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Analysis of the economic determinants of an excessive deficit 
Prob(Def3=1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
PrimGBS(-1) -0.9252 
(-8.64)*** 
 -0.8917 
(-8.07)*** 
-0.8481 
(-8.21)*** 
-0.9212 
(-8.37)*** 
-0.9194 
(-8.57)*** 
-0.9642 
(-8.16)*** 
PrimTExp(-1)  0.8267 
(8.10)*** 
     
TRevenue(-1)  -0.8476 
(-7.46)*** 
     
Debt(-1) 0.0715 
(5.64)*** 
0.1384 
(4.00)*** 
0.0617 
(5.15)*** 
0.0477 
(3.92)*** 
0.0753 
(5.86)*** 
0.0726 
(5.66)*** 
0.0803 
(5.79)*** 
Debt_sq(-1)  -0.0004 
(-1.84)* 
     
GRGDP -0.3959 
(-4.88)*** 
-0.4402 
(-5.14)*** 
   -0.3843 
(-4.62)*** 
-0.3596 
(-4.23)*** 
OutpGap   -0.3914 
(-4.46)*** 
    
UR    0.1853 
(2.20)** 
   
ChgUR     0.8971 
(4.49)*** 
  
RIR(-1) 0.1071 
(1.73)* 
0.0470 
(0.74) 
0.1000 
(1.58) 
0.0535 
(0.84) 
0.1158 
(1.77)* 
0.1346 
(1.80)* 
0.0837 
(1.29) 
Infl      0.0409 
(0.67) 
 
D92 -1.0318 
(-2.25)** 
-1.4697 
(-3.12)*** 
-1.1270 
(-2.40)** 
-0.7499 
(-1.75)* 
-0.8255 
(-1.89)* 
-0.9109 
(-1.86)* 
 
D9298       0.9952 
(1.23) 
D9298t       -0.4933 
(-2.91)*** 
D99 -1.1978 
(-2.42)** 
-1.4256 
(-2.86)*** 
-0.8631 
(-1.74)* 
-1.1330 
(-2.42)** 
-1.1972 
(-2.37)** 
-1.0992 
(-2.14)** 
-2.0985 
(-2.20)** 
D99t       -0.0786 
(-0.48) 
Left 0.8188 
(0.035)** 
1.0058 
(2.51)** 
0.8407 
(2.17)** 
0.8175 
(2.18)** 
0.8574 
(2.19)** 
0.8384 
(2.14)** 
0.9647 
(2.37)** 
ElectYear 0.9218 
(0.008)*** 
0.8360 
(2.40)** 
1.0046 
(2.85)*** 
0.9111 
(2.73)*** 
1.0586 
(2.99)*** 
0.9364 
(2.67)*** 
0.9041 
(2.55)** 
MinGov -1.0446 
(-1.91)* 
-0.9854 
(-1.77)* 
-1.3543 
(-2.45)** 
-1.1943 
(-2.20)** 
-1.3583 
(-2.45)** 
-1.0431 
(-1.90)* 
-0.9256 
(-1.68)* 
Log-Likelihood -115.08 -116.41 -114.75 -126.65 -115.66 -114.85 -110.25 
AIC 248.16 254.82 247.49 271.30 249.31 249.71 242.51 
SBIC 286.27 301.39 285.00 309.41 287.42 292.05 289.09 
No. Observ. 510 510 477 510 510 510 510 
Notes: The z-statistics for the estimated coefficients are in parentheses. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is
rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. The coefficients were estimated using a conditional logit fixed effects estimator.
AIC=2(-lnL+k), where k is the number of regressors; and SBIC=2(-lnL+(k/2)lnN), where N is the number of observations. 
McFadden’s R2=1-lnL/lnL0, where L0 is the log-likelihood computed with only a constant term. 
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Table 2. Analysis of the political determinants of an excessive deficit I 
Prob(Def3=1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
PrimGBS(-1) -0.9259 
(-8.67)*** 
-0.9289 
(-8.62)*** 
-0.9352 
(-8.61)*** 
-0.9559 
(-8.49)*** 
-0.9164 
(-8.61)*** 
-0.9211 
(-8.60)*** 
-0.9434 
(-8.50)*** 
Debt(-1) 0.0690 
(5.53)*** 
0.0695 
(5.45)*** 
0.0730 
(5.71)*** 
0.0702 
(5.46)*** 
0.0711 
(5.64)*** 
0.0725 
(5.70)*** 
0.0736 
(5.68)*** 
GRGDP -0.4059 
(-4.99)*** 
-0.4250 
(-5.07)*** 
-0.3941 
(-4.88)*** 
-0.4147 
(-5.05)*** 
-0.3935 
(-4.96)*** 
-0.3959 
(-4.83)*** 
-0.3966 
(-4.89)*** 
RIR(-1) 0.1192 
(1.94)* 
0.1409 
(2.26)** 
0.1059 
(1.72)* 
0.1164 
(1.87)* 
0.0982 
(1.60) 
0.1042 
(1.70)* 
0.1097 
(1.82)* 
D92 -1.1530 
(-2.50)** 
-1.3313 
(-2.82)*** 
-1.0304 
(-2.25)** 
-1.0608 
(-2.28)** 
-1.0190 
(-2.26)** 
-1.052 
(-2.27)** 
-1.1887 
(-2.57)*** 
D99 -1.0647 
(-2.20)** 
-0.9296 
(-1.93)* 
-1.2322 
(-2.48)** 
-1.1801 
(-2.35)** 
-1.2003 
(-2.44)** 
-1.2321 
(-2.47)** 
-1.1421 
(-2.33)** 
Left   0.8320 
(2.13)** 
0.7810 
(1.99)** 
0.7358 
(1.92)* 
0.8091 
(2.09)** 
0.6831 
(1.79)* 
GovParty 0.2338 
(2.06)** 
      
%Right  -0.0139 
(-2.53)** 
     
ElectYear 0.8635 
(2.49)** 
0.8638 
(2.48)** 
1.0783 
(2.87)*** 
  1.0845 
(2.93)*** 
 
YrBeforeElect   0.4318 
(1.20) 
    
ElectQ1    0.2820 
(0.39) 
   
ElectQ2    1.4546 
(2.76)*** 
   
ElectQ3    1.7544 
(1.99)** 
   
ElectQ4    0.2259 
(0.39) 
   
PolCycle     -0.5514 
(-1.79)* 
  
YrAfterElect      0.5006 
(1.39) 
-0.5063 
(-1.15) 
2YrAfterElect       -1.0431 
(-2.31)** 
3YrAfterElect       -0.8030 
(-1.75)* 
MinGov -0.9919 
(-1.84)* 
-1.1647 
(-2.13)** 
-1.1125 
(-2.02)** 
-1.0218 
(-1.86)* 
-0.9597 
(-1.79)* 
-1.0703 
(-1.94)* 
-0.9074 
(-1.69)* 
Log-Likelihood -115.15 -114.01 -114.36 -112.81 -117.06 -114.10 -115.70 
AIC 248.30 246.0151 248.72 249.62 252.12 248.21 253.40 
SBIC 286.41 284.12 291.06 300.44 290.23 290.55 299.98 
No. Observ. 510 510 510 510 510 510 510 
Notes: The z-statistics for the estimated coefficients are in parentheses. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is 
rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. The coefficients were estimated using a conditional logit fixed effects estimator. 
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Table 3. Analysis of the political determinants of an excessive deficit II 
Prob(Def3=1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
PrimGBS(-1) -0.9096 
(-8.57)*** 
-0.9321 
(-8.64)*** 
-0.9318 
(-8.64)*** 
-0.9170 
(-8.53)*** 
-0.9241 
(-8.64)*** 
-0.9391 
(-8.60)*** 
-0.9155 
(-8.45)*** 
Debt(-1) 0.0707 
(5.57)*** 
0.0729 
(5.68)*** 
0.0732 
(5.71)*** 
0.0742 
(5.73)*** 
0.0710 
(5.56)*** 
0.0734 
(5.67)*** 
0.0724 
(5.65)*** 
GRGDP -0.3755 
(-4.64)*** 
-0.3993 
(-4.88)*** 
-0.4026 
(-4.92)*** 
-0.3923 
(-4.79)*** 
-0.3945 
(-4.86)*** 
-0.4043 
(-4.92)*** 
-0.3970 
(-4.88)*** 
RIR(-1) 0.1319 
(2.02)** 
0.0930 
(1.48) 
0.1008 
(1.62) 
0.0848 
(1.31) 
0.1109 
(1.76)* 
0.0974 
(1.55) 
0.1033 
(1.66)* 
D92 -1.0271 
(-2.27)** 
-0.9270 
(-2.01)** 
-1.0393 
(-2.26)** 
-0.9822 
(-2.14)** 
-1.0412 
(-2.27)** 
-0.9688 
(-2.09)** 
-0.9651 
(-2.04)** 
D99 -1.0698 
(-2.19)** 
-1.1999 
(-2.42)** 
-1.1250 
(-2.30)** 
-1.2280 
(-2.45)** 
-1.1981 
(-2.42)** 
-1.2127 
(-2.44)** 
-1.2295 
(-2.47)** 
Left 0.8182 
(2.09)** 
0.7649 
(1.99)** 
0.7170 
(1.88)* 
0.7514 
(1.92)* 
0.8633 
(2.09)** 
0.7292 
(1.83)* 
0.7962 
(2.04)** 
ElectYear  0.9588 
(2.73)*** 
0.9464 
(2.70)*** 
0.9429 
(2.71)*** 
0.9216 
(2.64)*** 
0.9497 
(2.71)*** 
0.9296 
(2.66)*** 
NGovChg 0.6950 
(2.52)** 
      
MinGov -1.0964 
(-1.99)** 
  -1.2241 
(-2.16)** 
-1.0104 
(-1.82)* 
 -0.9782 
(-1.75)* 
RSIndex  -0.5093 
(-2.35)** 
     
GovType   -0.4026 
(-2.08)** 
    
NPartyGov    -0.3030 
(-1.33) 
   
SPGov     -0.1904 
(-0.33) 
  
MajSPGov      1.4687 
(2.17)** 
 
CoalGov      0.7109 
(1.13) 
 
FragIndex       -0.1656 
(-0.54) 
Log-Likelihood -115.34 -114.10 -114.76 -114.13 -115.03 -114.50 -114.93 
AIC 248.69 246.20 247.51 248.25 250.05 249.00 249.87 
SBIC 286.80 284.31 285.62 290.60 292.40 291.35 292.21 
No. Observ. 510 510 510 510 510 510 510 
Notes: The z-statistics for the estimated coefficients are in parentheses. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is
rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. The coefficients were estimated using a conditional logit fixed effects estimator. 
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Table 4. Additional effects from the interaction between the determinants of an excessive deficit 
Prob(Def3=1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
PrimGBS(-1) -0.9278 
(-8.61)*** 
-0.9371 
(-8.32)*** 
-0.9225 
(-8.54)*** 
-0.9557 
(-8.31)*** 
-0.9374 
(-8.51)*** 
-0.9184 
(-8.55)*** 
-0.9281 
(-8.65)*** 
-0.9254 
(-8.58)*** 
Debt(-1) 0.0716 
(5.66)*** 
0.0748 
(5.77)*** 
0.0706 
(5.52)*** 
0.0726 
(5.53)*** 
0.0715 
(5.64)*** 
0.0687 
(5.37)*** 
0.0712 
(5.46)*** 
0.0703 
(5.31)*** 
GRGDP -0.3765 
(-4.14)*** 
 -0.3977 
(-4.78)*** 
-0.4171 
(-4.95)*** 
-0.4203 
(-4.71)*** 
-0.3938 
(-4.87)*** 
-0.3982 
(-4.86)*** 
-0.4113 
(-4.99)*** 
ChgUR  0.7474 
(3.50)*** 
      
RIR(-1) 0.1085 
(1.75)* 
0.1264 
(1.91)* 
0.1091 
(1.78)* 
0.1040 
(1.68)* 
0.1001 
(1.56) 
0.1151 
(1.83)* 
0.1081 
(1.64) 
0.1098 
(1.66)* 
D92 -1.0102 
(-2.19)** 
-0.7826 
(-1.77)* 
-1.1554 
(-2.02)** 
-1.1121 
(-2.35)** 
-0.9873 
(-2.15)** 
-0.8970 
(-1.93)* 
-1.1930 
(-2.55)** 
-1.0887 
(-2.32)** 
D99 -1.2004 
(-2.43)** 
-1.2143 
(-2.39)** 
-1.5985 
(-2.93)*** 
-2.7288 
(-3.50)*** 
-1.3694 
(-2.66)*** 
-1.2483 
(-2.49)** 
-1.2907 
(-2.53)** 
-1.3170 
(-2.54)** 
Left 1.0089 
(1.74)* 
0.7675 
(1.93)* 
0.3716 
(0.76) 
0.3389 
(0.79) 
0.5089 
(1.23) 
1.1857 
(2.68)*** 
0.0321 
(0.05) 
-.0119 
(-0.02) 
Left*GRGDP -0.0783 
(-0.44) 
       
Left*ChgUR  0.6408 
(1.56) 
      
Left*D92   1.4148 
(1.74)* 
     
Left*D99    2.9306 
(2.97)*** 
    
ElectYear 0.9141 
(2.61)*** 
1.0642 
(3.00)*** 
0.7334 
(1.65)* 
0.6774 
(1.74)* 
0.4907 
(1.18) 
0.9347 
(2.65)*** 
0.9459 
(2.70)*** 
0.9819 
(2.78)*** 
ElectYear*D92   0.4512 
(0.64) 
     
ElectYear*D99    2.1556 
(2.11)** 
    
ElectYear*Left     1.5307 
(2.13)** 
   
MinGov -1.0505 
(-1.93)* 
-1.3828 
(-2.51)** 
-0.6228 
(-0.98) 
-0.9606 
(-1.68)* 
-1.2055 
(-2.16)** 
-0.4453 
(-0.69) 
-1.1592 
(-2.02)** 
-0.8098 
(-1.25) 
MinGov*D92   -1.6136 
(-1.72)* 
     
MinGov*D99    -16.919 
(-0.02) 
    
MinGov*Left      -1.6298 
(-1.80)* 
  
SPGov       -0.8852 
(-1.30) 
 
SPGov*Left       1.6156 
(1.93)* 
 
MajSPGov        -0.3388 
(-0.40) 
MajSPGov*Left        2.1297 
(2.48)** 
Log-Likelihood -114.98 -114.42 -112.56 -107.70 -110.30 -113.43 -113.08 -111.28 
AIC 249.96 248.83 249.12 239.40 240.61 246.87 248.16 244.56 
SBIC 292.30 291.18 299.93 290.21 282.89 289.21 294.74 291.14 
No. Observ. 510 510 510 510 510 510 510 510 
Notes: The z-statistics for the estimated coefficients are in parentheses. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: 
***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. The coefficients were estimated using a conditional logit fixed effects estimator. 
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Table 5. Robustness checks 
Prob(Def3=1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
PrimGBS(-1) -1.3034 
(-5.00)*** 
-0.6428 
(-4.32)*** 
-0.7758 
(-3.50)*** 
-1.1997 
(-5.07)*** 
-0.7944 
(-6.12)*** 
-0.9986 
(-5.61)*** 
-0.9460 
(-5.72)*** 
Debt(-1) 0.0599 
(3.03)*** 
0.0281 
(0.83) 
0.0664 
(1.43) 
0.0763 
(2.76)*** 
0.0778 
(4.60)*** 
0.0798 
(4.12)*** 
0.0769 
(3.19)*** 
GRGDP -0.5018 
(-3.65)*** 
-0.7895 
(-3.45)*** 
-0.8851 
(-3.17)*** 
-0.8070 
(-3.56)*** 
-0.3266 
(-3.57)*** 
-0.3376 
(-3.02)*** 
-0.6907 
(-4.22)*** 
RIR(-1) 0.2008 
(2.07)** 
0.1717 
(0.75) 
0.3630 
(1.28) 
0.3122 
(2.64)*** 
0.0252 
(0.27) 
0.1167 
(1.26) 
0.0698 
(0.42) 
D92    -0.6082 
(-0.68) 
-1.6118 
(-2.62)*** 
-2.0526 
(-2.46)** 
-0.8877 
(-1.34) 
D99  -1.7224 
(-2.17)** 
-2.1307 
(-2.16)** 
-0.8200 
(-0.90) 
-2.1255 
(-2.82)*** 
-2.4183 
(-2.83)*** 
-1.0147 
(-1.31) 
Left 1.5550 
(1.83)* 
1.4511 
(1.85)* 
2.8218 
(2.68)*** 
2.3473 
(2.20)** 
1.5963 
(2.04)** 
3.2750 
(3.49)*** 
-0.2297 
(-0.38) 
ElectYear 1.2507 
(2.23)** 
1.0114 
(1.87)* 
1.7641 
(2.52)** 
1.2529 
(1.85)* 
0.9970 
(2.15)** 
0.6448 
(1.19) 
1.3693 
(2.73)*** 
MinGov -1.4267 
(-1.48) 
-0.7268 
(-0.65) 
-2.1538 
(-1.69)* 
-1.0409 
(-0.99) 
-1.3475 
(-1.78)* 
-2.5472 
(-2.63)*** 
-0.2494 
(-0.24) 
NPartyGov 0.1210 
(0.33) 
-0.5974 
(-1.77)* 
-1.3369 
(-3.02)*** 
-0.8657 
(-1.90)* 
0.0517 
(0.17) 
-0.2587 
(-0.70) 
-0.4155 
(-1.17) 
Log-Likelihood -39.83 -44.08 -30.18 -34.68 -66.36 -46.30 -56.34 
AIC 95.66 106.17 78.36 89.37 152.71 112.60 132.69 
SBIC 123.61 134.90 105.45 120.55 191.09 147.32 168.74 
No. Observ. 243 180 150 167 343 238 272 
Time period 1970-1991 1992-2006 1992-2006 1970-2006 1970-2006 1970-2006 1970-2006 
No. Countries 13 12 10 5 10 7 8 
Notes: The z-statistics for the estimated coefficients are in parentheses. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is
rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. The coefficients were estimated using a conditional logit fixed effects estimator.
Regression 1 considers only the period before Maastricht (1970-1991); Finland and Italy were automatically dropped in this 
regression due to lack of variability of the dependent variable (Finland never presents an excessive deficit during this
period, while Italy is always in a situation of excessive deficit). Regression 2 considers just the period 1992-2006; 
Regression 3 considers the same period but only the countries that took part in EMU. Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg
were dropped in these two regressions due to lack of variability of the dependent variable; in this case, these countries have
never had excessive deficits in the period 1992-2006. Regression 4 includes only the 5 largest EU countries and regression 5 
includes the remaining 10 ‘small’ countries. Regression 6 includes only the countries that run excessive deficits in more
than half of the years in the period 1970-2006 (Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the UK), whilst 
regression 7 presents results for the other countries. 
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ANNEX 
 
A.1. Description of the variables and respective sources 
Economic Variables: 
Def3 – [dependent variable] dummy variable that takes value 1 when the government budget surplus (GBS) is lower 
than -3% of gross domestic product (GDP), and 0 otherwise. Source: own computation from GBS. 
GBS – general government budget surplus as a percentage of at GDP market prices (European Commission excessive 
deficit procedure). Source: European Commission (2007), AMECO database. 
PrimGBS – primary (excluding interest) general government budget surplus as a percentage of GDP at market prices 
(European Commission excessive deficit procedure). Source: European Commission (2007), AMECO 
database. 
PrimTExp – primary (excluding interest) general government total expenditure as percentage of GDP at market prices 
(European Commission excessive deficit procedure). Source: European Commission (2007), AMECO 
database. 
TRevenue – general government total revenues as percentage of GDP at market prices (European Commission 
excessive deficit procedure). Source: European Commission (2007), AMECO database. 
Debt – general government consolidated gross public debt as a percentage of GDP at market prices (European 
Commission excessive deficit procedure). Source: European Commission (2007), AMECO database. 
Debt_sq – square of Debt (Debt^2). Source: own computation from Debt. 
GRGDP – annual growth of real GDP at price levels of 2000 (national currency). Source: European Commission 
(2007), AMECO database. 
OutpGap – the output gap is computed as the gap between actual and potential GDP as a percentage of potential GDP 
at 2000 market prices. Source: European Commission (2007), AMECO database. 
UR – unemployment rate (Eurostat definition). Source: European Commission (2007), AMECO database. 
ChgUR – annual change in the unemployment rate (URt - URt-1). Source: own computation from UR. 
RIR – real long-term interest rate (deflator GDP). Source: European Commission (2007), AMECO database. 
Infl – inflation rate; change in the national consumer price index (CPI: 2000=100). Source: European Commission 
(2007), AMECO database. 
 
Political variables: 
GovParty – cabinet composition or political orientation of the government. GovParty = 1 (hegemony of right-wing 
parties); 2 (dominance of right-wing parties); 3 (path between left and right); 4 (dominance of left-wing 
parties); 5 (hegemony of left-wing parties). There is hegemony of left (right) parties in the government when 
the cabinet is totally composed by left (right) wing parties; when the cabinet is not totally composed by left 
(right) parties but more than 66.6% are left (right) parties, then there is dominance of left (right) wing parties; 
finally, when the government is composed by less than 66.6% of left (right) wing parties (but more than 
33.3%), then we are in presence of a centre government (path between left and right). Sources: Armingeon et 
al (2005) for the period 1970-2004 and www.electionworld.org for 2005 and 2006. 
Left – dummy variable that takes value 1 when GovParty is equal to 4 or 5, and 0 otherwise. Source: own 
computation from GovParty. 
%Right – percentage of right-wing parties in the cabinet. Sources: Armingeon et al (2005) for the period 1970-2004 
and www.electionworld.org for 2005 and 2006. 
ElectYear – election year is a dummy that takes value 1 in years of general (parliamentary) elections and 0 in non-
election years. Sources: Armingeon et al (2005) for the period 1970-2004 and www.electionworld.org for 
2005 and 2006. 
ElectQ1, ElectQ2, ElectQ3, and ElectQ4 – dummy variables that take the value of 1 in the respective quarter (Q1, 
Q2, Q3, Q4) in which the election takes place in a particular year, and 0 otherwise. Sources: Armingeon et al 
(2005) for the period 1970-2004 and www.electionworld.org for 2005 and 2006. 
YrBeforeElect – dummy variable that takes value 1 in the years before elections, and 0 otherwise. Source: own 
computation from ElectYear. 
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PolCycle – dummy variable that takes value 1 in the first half of the political cycle of a government. Source: own 
computation from ElectYear. 
YrAfterElect – dummy variable that takes value 1 in the years after elections, and 0 otherwise. Source: own 
computation from ElectYear. 
2YrAfterElect – dummy variable that takes value 1 two years after the previous election, and 0 otherwise. Source: 
own computation from ElectYear. 
3YrAfterElect – dummy variable that takes value 1 three years after the previous elections, and 0 otherwise. Source: 
own computation from ElectYear. 
NGovChg – number of changes in government per year due to due to elections, resignation of the Prime-Minister, 
dissension within government, lack of parliamentary support, or intervention by the head of state. Sources: 
Armingeon et al (2005) for the period 1970-2004 and www.electionworld.org for 2005 and 2006. 
RSIndex – Roubini and Sachs’ (1989) index for the fragmentation of the political system. RSIndex = 1 (one-party 
majority parliamentary government); 2 (coalition parliamentary government with 2 coalition partners); 3 
(coalition parliamentary government with 3 or more coalition partners); 4 (minority parliamentary 
government). Sources: Armingeon et al (2005): 1970-2004; Woldendrop et al. (1998): 1970-1995; The 
European Journal of Political Research (several annual issues of political data: 1997-2006):1996-2005; The 
Europa World Yearbook (1996) and The Statesman's Yearbook for missing values for Greece, Portugal and 
Spain: 1973-1995; and www.electionworld.org: 2005 and 2006. 
GovType – type of government in office. GovType = 1 (majority single-party government); 2 (minimal winning 
coalition); 3 (surplus coalition); 4 (single-party minority government); 5 (multi-party minority government); 6 
(caretaker government). Sources: Armingeon et al (2005) for the period 1970-2004 and 
www.electionworld.org for 2005 and 2006. 
MajSPGov – dummy variable that takes value 1 when the government is formed by a single-party with majority in the 
parliament (GovType=1), and 0 otherwise. Source: own computation from GovType. 
CoalGov – dummy variable that takes value 1 when the government is formed by a coalition with majority in the 
parliament (GovType equal to 2 or 3), and 0 otherwise. Source: own computation from GovType. 
MinGov – dummy variable that takes value 1 when a minority government is in office, i.e. when GovType is equal to 
4, 5 or 6, and 0 if the (single-party or coalition) government has majority in the parliament. Source: own 
computation from GovType. 
NGovParty – number of parties in the government. Sources: Woldendrop et al. (1998) for the period 1970-1995; The 
European Journal of Political Research (several annual issues of political data: 1997-2006 – compiled by 
Richard Katz, Ruud Koole and Ingrid van Biezen) for the period 1996-2005; The values for Greece, Portugal 
and Spain over the period 1973-1995 were collected from The Europa World Yearbook (1996) and The 
Statesman's Yearbook (several issues from 1974 to 1997); and data for 2006 were obtained from 
www.electionworld.org. 
SPGov – dummy variable that takes value 1 when a single party government is in office, i.e. when NGovParty is 
equal to 1, and 0 otherwise (multi-party governments). Source: own computation from NGovParty. 
FragIndex – fragmentation index of the distribution of seats in the parliament. FragIndex = 1/Σpi2, where pi is the 
percentage of seats of party i in the parliament. Source: Armingeon et al (2005) for the period 1970-2004 and 
www.electionworld.org for 2005 and 2006. 
 
Control variables for the EU fiscal constraints: 
D92 – dummy variable that takes value 1 in the period 1992-2006, and 0 in the period 1970-1991. 
D99 – dummy variable that takes value 1 in the period 1999-2006, and 0 in the period 1970-1998. 
D9298 – dummy variable that takes value 1 in the period 1992-1998, and 0 over 1970-1991 and 1999-2006. 
D9298t – time trend for the period 1992-1998; 0 otherwise. 
D99t – time trend for the period 1999-2006; 0 otherwise. 
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A.2. Figures 
Figure A.2.1. Evolution of the government budget surplus (GBS) in the EU countries, 
EU-area and USA over the period 1970-2006 
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Source: European Commission (2007), AMECO database. 
 
Figure A.2.2. Number of times each EU country is in excessive deficit over the period 1970-2006 
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Source: European Commission (2007), AMECO database. 
 
Figure A.2.3. Number of EU countries in excessive deficit by year: 1970-2006 
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Source: European Commission (2007), AMECO database. 
 
